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Meanings of Failed Action: 
a reassessment of the 1946 Royal Indian Navy uprising 
 
Abstract: The exhibition Meanings of Failed Action: Insurrection 1946 opened in Mumbai on 17 
March 2017 and in New Delhi on 8 February 2018.  The second part of Vivan Sundaram’s The History 
Project,1 this new installation was intended to mark seventy years of Indian independence and partition 
by exploring an often forgotten moment of Indian history: the uprising of the Royal Indian Navy’s 
ratings in February 1946, when 10,000 naval ratings took charge of 66 ships across the Indian 
subcontinent in the name of the ‘Quit India’ movement. R.I.A.F. men, Sepoys, Bombay’s industrial 
workers and the city’s population joined in, marching in solidarity with the ratings irrespective of 
caste and religious affiliation. But the Congress and the Muslim League condemned the action and 
consented to British military intervention, which resulted in the deaths of over two hundred people and 
the ratings’ imprisonment. The event has since been erased from Indian national history, perhaps 
because, had the insurrection succeeded, India’s struggle for freedom might have taken a different 
turn. I worked on the exhibition as a researcher for the artist, with Ashish Rajadhyaksha and David 
Chapman, for over a year. The question we sought to answer during those months was: what is the 
significance of that uprising for India today? With this question in mind, in what follows I focus on the 
documents we unearthed in the process – pamphlets, slogans, the ratings’ statements to the police and 
Inquiry, their memories and prison letters – and examine the motivations and hopes that defined the 
strikers’ action. What kind of freedom did the ratings stand for? 
 
Keywords: Royal Indian Navy, nationalism, uprising, historiography, individuation, Vivan Sundaram.  
                                                             
1 At Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya, 17-25 Mar. 2017, and Kiran Nadar Museum of Modern 
Art, Feb. 2018 [See http://insurrection1946.in, accessed 30 Dec. 2017]. The first part consists of Structures of 
Memory: Modern Bengal, at Victoria Memorial Hall, Calcutta 1998. 
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What you notice as realistic…is not necessarily or certainly real. 
The potential and the historical roots and the detours of possibilities also belong to reality. 
The realistic result, the actual result, is only an abstraction that has murdered 
all other possibilities for the moment. But these possibilities will recur. 
Alexander Kluge2 
 
 
The event 
 
On 18 February 1946 a strike was declared on the H.M.I.S. Talwar, the signal training establishment 
of the Royal Indian Navy at Colaba, Bombay. Called by 1,100 communication ratings, it quickly 
spread: by the end of the next day a total of around 10,000 naval ratings had taken charge of 66 ships 
and on-shore naval establishments across the subcontinent.3 The uprising’s foci were Bombay and 
Karachi, but sympathetic strikes took place in other military establishments in Bombay, Madras, 
Vishakhapatnam, Calcutta, Delhi, Cochin, Jamnagar, the Andamans, Baharain and Aden, involving 
also R.I.A.F. men and Sepoys. On the following day the ratings issued a ‘Charter of Demands’ that 
asked for 
 
1. Release of all Indian political prisoners; 
2. Release of all Indian National Army personnel unconditionally; 
3. Withdrawal of all Indian troops from Indonesia and Egypt; 
4. British nationals to quit India; 
5. Actions against the commanding officer and signal bosonshead for rough 
treatment of the crew; 
6. Release of all detainees (naval ratings); 
7. Speedy demobilisation of the RIN ratings and officers; 
8. Equal status with the British navy regarding pay, family allowances and 
other facilities; 
9. Best class of Indian food; 
10. No return of clothing kit after discharge from service; 
11. Better treatment from officers to subordinates; 
                                                             
2 Alexander Kluge and Jan Dawson, ‘The Invisible Indivisible Man: Alexander Kluge Interview’, in Film 
Comment, November-December 1974. [Available at 
https://www.filmcomment.com/issue/november-december-1974/, accessed 3 May 2017]. 
3 Bipan Chandra, India’s Struggle for Independence (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1988), p. 480: according to 
some sources, 20,000 ratings took part in the strike, which involved 78 ships and 20 shore establishments.  
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12. Installation of Indian officers and supervisors.4 
 
The ratings appealed to the nationalist leadership of India, then at the threshold of independence 
from British rule, but the Congress and the Muslim League condemned the ratings’ action and 
refused support. On the fourth day the city’s industrial workers from the nearby mills joined in 
solidarity, while the city’s population marched in large numbers. 
When news came in that the Royal Indian Navy ships in Bombay harbour had mutinied and 
that, in support of them, the trade unions in Bombay had declared a general strike, the colonial 
establishment initially deployed Indian soldiers . But the ratings’ actions merely sparked solidarity 
between the sailors, infantry soldiers, airmen and R.I.A.F. pilots, ordinary mill hands, students, 
workers, citizens in many cantonments, military stations as far afield as Karachi, the Punjab, Calcutta 
and port cities of the Peninsula. As the loyalty of the Indian soldiers could not longer be assured, and 
the riots in Bombay spread from the Fort Barracks on to the streets, first off Colaba and then off 
Parel-Lalbaug, the British forces were called in: the Royal Navy, the military and the police. The 
heavy cruiser H.M.S. Glasgow was posted to take charge of the rebellion. Bombay closed down. In 
an All India Radio broadcast Vice-Admiral John Henry Godfrey, Flag Officer Commanding R.I.N., 
demanded ‘unconditional surrender’, threatening ‘if necessary’ to wipe out the navy.5 The curfew 
that followed resulted in over two hundred people dead, most of them civilians,6 including Kamal 
Donde, Communist activist and Treasurer of the Parel Mahila Sangh, the association which collected 
food from the homes of mill workers and organised the koli (fisher caste) women to deliver it to the 
striking sailors. The strike ended on the dawn of 23 February, when the Naval Central Strike 
Committee (N.C.S.C.) asked for black flags of surrender to be raised. In spite of the national leaders’ 
                                                             
4 Biswanath Bose, RIN Mutiny: 1946 (Reference and Guide for All) (New Delhi: Northern Book Centre, 1988), 
p. 183. 
5 John Henry Godfrey, Private Papers, Vol. 2. 1943-46, National Maritime Museum London, GOD/42. In the 
foreign press, news of Godfrey’s All India Radio broadcast was reported by, among other papers, the Daily 
Telegraph (21 Feb. 1946, p. 6). 
6 Chandra, India’s Struggle for Independence, p. 483: 228 civilian died in Bombay and 1046 were injured. 
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reassurance, a large contingent of ratings was arrested, imprisoned for months in camps under 
appalling conditions, and eventually discharged with dishonour. 
The incident remains a political enigma. On the one hand widely considered a failure, the 
R.I.N. ‘mutiny’ (as it was soon labelled by the colonial administration) has been viewed as a 
relatively minor incident at an especially turbulent moment in Indian politics. With the outbreak of 
WWII, British-ruled territories across South and South-East Asia were became a massive asset in the 
war effort, providing huge quantities of soldiers.7 In India, Britain’s failure to consult with the 
nationalist leaders about the country’s participation in the war and Churchill’s refusal to grant a 
measure of freedom in return for cooperation opened up divisions within the nationalist leadership. 
The Congress opposed participation unless its demands were met, the Muslim League offered 
support in return of promises of autonomous sovereignty for Indian Muslims, and, by January 1942, 
even while reiterating the Congress’ demands, the Communist Part of India (C.P.I.) lined up with the 
international Communist movement calling for full support for the anti-fascist war. From December 
1941 the Japanese advance through South-East Asia swept the British out of Malaysia, Singapore 
and Burma, and threatened to reach also India. For the populations involved in fighting back there 
was no question of going back to colonial rule after the war. Nationalist movements were active 
across the region, and contact and solidarity with these populations played an important role in the 
politicisation of the Indian men serving in the navy. The British defeat at the hands of the Japanese 
also led to a renewed but feeble attempt to enlist Congress’ support for the war effort, with the 
Cripps Mission. Gandhi’s response to its collapse was the Quit India Resolution (August 1942) and, 
as the nationalist leaders were arrested and mass demonstrations against their arrest were brutally 
repressed, demonstrations and strikes turned into a violent and widespread popular offensive. 
Thousands were killed and injured, and many more imprisoned. The so-called ‘August Rebellion’ 
                                                             
7 See Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941-1945 (London: 
Allan Lane, 2004). 
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lasted barely a month, but it had a lasting psychological impact on the Indian population, their sense 
of political entitlement and consciousness. For the leaders it brought to the foreground the issue of 
discipline among the masses – a concern shared by nationalist and colonial leaders alike and one that 
would partly determine their response to the R.I.N. uprising. Finally, an important factor in this 
context were the trials of 20,000 Indian National Army prisoners, which the British foolishly 
decided, initially, to hold as public trials at the Red Fort in Delhi. The trials attracted nation-wide 
sympathy for Subhas Chandra Bose’s soldiers and, from November 1945, triggered a pattern of 
periodic upheavals in Calcutta (by students and workers, Hindu and Muslim) that went on for 
months. Unconditional release of all I.N.A. prisoners was, significantly, one of the ratings’ demands. 
Between late 1945 and early 1946 India thus saw an unprecedented wave of strikes, often 
violent, across civilian and military establishments. One view has been to see these disturbances, for 
all their scale and diversity, as having been efficiently quelled in the end; at best as having hastened 
the coming of independence by a few months. This is the reading offered by Bipan Chandra in his 
seminal India’s Struggle for Independence (1988). On the other hand Sumit Sarkar concludes his 
magisterial Modern India: 1885–1947 (1983) claiming that, had this insurrection succeeded, India’s 
struggle for freedom might have taken a new turn. It was a challenge to the empire, shaking up a 
British patrician state and an imperial order the full might of which was on display in the events that 
took place in Bombay in those six days. But it also revealed schisms within a nationalist movement 
that was on the verge of forming the country’s first independent government. For this, the six days 
that marked the rating’s uprising were erased from Indian national history for decades.8 Over the 
years, however, poets, artists and, in a few instances, ex-ratings and sympathisers have returned to 
                                                             
8 The R.I.N. uprising is not discussed in Sumit Sarkar’s Modern Times (2014) or in Partha Chatterjee’s The 
Black Hole of Empire (2012). It is, however, examined in a very recent article by John M. Meyer, ‘The Royal 
Indian Navy Mutiny of 1946: Nationalist Competition and Civil-Military Relations in Postwar India’, The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 45, no. 1 (2017), pp. 46-49. I have no information about 
memory of the event in Pakistan historiography. 
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reappraise the events of February 1946 because, seventy years on, the ratings’ actions have resisted 
being assimilated into any single narrative. What kind of freedom did the ratings stand for? 
 
The evidence 
 
Research in Indian and British archives reveals that a large amount of material is available on the 
R.I.N. strike. Most of it consists of either official documents produced by the colonial administration, 
the British government in London, the R.I.N. Commission of Enquiry (set up soon after the event), 
and the Navy, or of press reports. In spite of colonial censorship and Commander-in-Chief Claude 
Auchinleck’s astute use of the press, the R.I.N. ‘mutiny’ was reported by every major and minor 
newspaper in the country. The international press, including a larger than expected range of British 
regional newspapers, also covered it.9 What is striking, given the extent of the coverage, is the relative 
scarcity of photographs. The picture that returns over and over is of a march of ratings in the streets of 
Bombay.10 It had originally appeared in The Times of India (20 February 1946, p. 8) with the title 
‘R.I.N. Demonstrators Run Wild in Bombay’ and a caption that read ‘The procession of R.I.N. 
demonstrators in Bombay who, armed with various weapons, created a wave of terror in the Fort area 
on Tuesday morning. The demonstration was in sympathy with the “strike” of ratings on H.M.I.S. 
Talwar.’ Note that no weapon is visible in the picture; the only thing carried by one of the 
demonstrators seems to be the Indian Swaraj tricolour.11 This photograph was followed two days later 
by another, in the front page of The Times of India (22 February 1946, p. 1), of ‘about a 1,000 R.I.A.F. 
                                                             
9 In India, the R.I.N. strike was reported in the Hindustan, The Times of India, Bombay Chronicle, The Pioneer, 
The Bombay Sentinel, Aaj, The Star, Jugantar, Amrita Bazaar Patrika, The People’s Age, The Free Press 
Journal and The Student. In Britain by Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, Daily Express, Manchester 
Guardian, Western Daily Express, Nottingham Evening Post and Glouchestershire Eco. Major international 
newspapers also covered it, including New York Herald Tribune, New York Times, Life Magazine and Pravda, 
as did Moscow and German radios.  
10 This photograph featured in Hindustan (23 Feb. 1946), The Student (9 Mar. 1946), and Amrita Bazar Patrika 
(26 Feb. 1946). 
11 This had become the official flag of Congress in 1931, was used as the battle ensign of the Indian National 
Army and, by 1946, as the symbol of the independence movement. 
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men [who] struck work in sympathy with the R.I.N. mutineers.’ Indeed the few photos published at 
the time show either marches (including the Daily Mirror, 25 February 1946, p. 1) and rallies (The 
Bombay Chronicle, 28 February 1946, p. 1), or the damage caused by the event, sometimes captioned 
as ‘acts of sabotage’ (for instance, in The Sphere: the Empire’s Illustrated Weekly, 2 March 1946, p. 
259). Only the People’s Age, organ of the C.P.I., and The Student published harrowing photographs of 
the casualties a week or so after the events (respectively on 3 March 1946, p. 1, and 9 March). Recent 
research in the archives of The Times of India reveals that several other pictures were taken at the time 
which, however, never appeared in any of the major papers.12 A few of these show demonstrations, 
but also the deployment of the British army’s against civilians (soldiers with rifles and tanks) and the 
casualties of the army’s brutal retaliation (piles of bodies in the morgue, and lines of bodies and the 
injured in the streets of Bombay). 
 
The installation 
 
Meanings of Failed Action: Insurrection 1946 was presented in the form of a monumental 
installation. Much of the historical material used was sourced over a period of twelve months by 
myself and Ashish Rajadhyaksha from British and Indian archives, including the extensive oral 
history collection of the Imperial War Museum, London. Other material was especially recorded for 
the sound-work, which was authored by sound artist David Chapman. The show originally run in 
Mumbai in March 2017 for nine days, was extensively covered by the media and seen by some 1,500 
people. It re-opened in New Delhi in February 2018 as part of a major retrospective of Vivan 
Sundaram’s work. 
                                                             
12 Vikram Doctor, ‘In the 70th Year of Independence, Here is a Look Back at the Long Forgotten 1946 RIN 
Mutiny’, in The Economic Times (2 April 2017), 
[https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/in-the-70th-year-of-independence-here-is-a-
look-back-at-the-long-forgotten-1946-rin-mutiny-in-mumbai/articleshow/57967250.cms, accessed 31 October 
2017]. 
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Central to the installation was a 40 foot-long steel-and-aluminium container with colour-
coated walls. The ‘hold’, illuminated by a coordinated light design, served as a performance space 
where a seated audience heard a 40-minute sound-work that merged archival and contemporary 
recordings. We knew from the start that this could not be a chronicle of the uprising. Voices of 
participants to the uprising and eyewitnesses combined with annotative texts by Indian historians and 
renditions of poetry, music, theatre and sound effects. The idea behind what turned out to be a fairly 
abstract yet emotional performance, was to open up the events of February 1946 to their potential 
and possibilities for today. During those nine days the public and school groups were thus invited to 
participate in talks and discussions. In the gallery space outside the container, excerpts from Indian 
and international newspapers, in multiple languages and with diverse points of view, were collaged 
to construct a long mural of the events and their aftermath. They included graphics and photographs 
from tabloids, broadsheets, student journals and political pamphlets. The fourth element of the 
installation was an archive of documents sourced from India and Britain: copies of telegraphic 
communications between the Viceroy Archibald Wavell, the Secretary of State for India and Burma 
Frederick Pethick-Lawrence and Prime Minister Clement Attlee, original political pamphlets, copies 
of Bombay police files on the ratings, including ratings letters from camps and prisons. A separate 
section, the ‘library’, displayed new books on the uprising and especially reprinted versions of older 
publications, while next to it projections showed still images of everyday life in the Royal Indian 
Navy, ashore and on board, naval recruitment pamphlets, and a selection of diary jottings, letters and 
private notes of British army and naval officers stationed in India commenting on the mutiny and on 
other political uprisings taking place within the armed forces. Finally, on a stage facing the container 
was displayed a reproduction of the painting RIN Bombay Naval Mutiny (1962) by Chittaprosad, a 
major artist working with the C.P.I. known for his graphic representations of its struggles. 
 
Invisibility 
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With the exception of Chittaprosad’s remarkable political drawings, which appeared at the time in the 
People’s Age, and coverage in The Free Press Journal, who se editor was approached directly by the 
ratings,13 none of the papers gave any ground of confidence to the strikers. By far the majority of them 
followed either the colonial administration or the nationalist leadership’s line – positions which, in the 
event, aligned. In the leaders’ eyes, as for the newspapers, this was a violent, faceless crowd – a 
‘mobocracy’, as Gandhi saw it.14 
The ratings, workers and civilians who took part in the strike belonged to different religious 
communities and castes, but marched as a single crowd. Significantly, writing about the photos in The 
Times of India’s archive, Vikram Doctor observes that  
 
The images are…confusing because their cause isn’t clear. Most pictures of protests have 
banners, placards and clearly distinguishable sides. Some pictures of the RIN protests show 
the marches that the rebelling navy ratings took out, so there is some semblance of 
organised protest, not random chaos. But what were the flags they were following? Who 
were the leaders of the marches?15 
 
The only newspaper to put a face to the events was The Free Press Journal (29 February 1946, p. 1): 
a picture of Balai Chand Dutt, the Leading Telegraphist of H.M.I.S. Talwar who had played a central 
role from the start. As Dutt himself put it, ‘where the R.I.N. mutiny was concerned, the rulers and the 
leaders of the ruled were no longer adversaries, but allies.’16 Jawaharlal Nehru, Gandhi, Sardar 
Vallabhbhai Patel, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and even Aruna Asaf Ali, the most militant of the Congress’ 
leading figures, called on the ratings to surrender and return to work. They advised them ‘not to mix 
                                                             
13 Balai Chand Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents (Mumbai: Bhashya Prakashan, 2015). Originally published in 
1971. 
14 Mohandas K. Gandhi, ‘Democracy vs Mobocracy’, in Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 21, (New 
Delhi: Publications Division Government of India, 1999), pp. 245-241. 
15 Doctor, ‘In the 70th Year of Independence, Here is a Look Back at the Long Forgotten 1946 RIN Mutiny’. On 
the ships the ratings hoisted three flags tied together: the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League and the 
Communist of Party of India’s flags. 
16 Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents, p. 234. 
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up “political demands along with service demands”; to “remain calm” and to formulate to the Naval 
authorities their service demands.’17 When the British army struck, killing and injuring hundreds of 
civilians, the national leaders looked the other way. After the surrender their promise to do their best 
to see that the striking ratings would not be victimised was soon forgotten. Years later B.C. Dutt would 
write: ‘we had our battleship Potemkin but no Eisenstein.’18 
In the light of what was clearly a concerted effort on the part of the colonial and nationalist 
establishments, and of the media, to isolate the ratings from the people who marched in their support, 
what interests me here are documents that convey the ratings’ voices, the language the ratings used to 
advance their demands. Newspapers and photographs were not within the ratings’ reach, but the 1,100 
who struck work on H.M.I.S. Talwar were communication ratings, adept at encoding, decoding and 
intercepting messages in several Indian languages as well as English. The wireless, telegraph and other 
forms of writing – pamphlets, slogans and letters – were media well within their reach. There are also 
the statements, the ‘evidence’ many of them gave when called as witnesses in front of the R.I.N. 
Commission of Enquiry. Third, there is B.C. Dutt’s own account, his Mutiny of the Innocents, written 
many years after the event and first published in 1971. These written documents are worth closer 
scrutiny than they have been deemed to deserve to date. What the ratings said and how they said it may 
tell us something of the reasons for the invisibility of the R.I.N. uprising in Indian historiography and 
its significance today. 
 
Collective and singular voices 
 
Contemporary and later commentators have tended to assimilate the ratings’ demands and actions into 
two narratives. One tendency has been to reduce the first to complaints about unsatisfactory service 
                                                             
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., p. 33. 
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conditions and racially-based mistreatment. This was the story preferred by the political establishment, 
colonial and nationalist. The other situates the ratings’ actions within a pre-existing narrative of 
factions within Indian nationalism, where the R.I.N. strike is linked to the I.N.A. trial and/or conflated 
with the strategies and position of the C.P.I.. The I.N.A. trials were indeed a crucial factor in this and 
other uprisings in those months, and the C.P.I. did intervene by calling a workers’ strike in support of 
the ratings. It also circulated pamphlets that were found in the ratings’ possession. Some of these have 
a distinctly political, inflammatory flavour, and all of them are signed by a collective entity or a 
representative thereof: 
 
Jai Hind… 
Friends, when we, Hindus and Muslims, are fighting together for the freedom of our 
motherland, there is no power on earth that will stop us from achieving the same. Today on 
our side, are the Navy, the Air Force and we are getting reinforcements. …Either perish 
yourself or abolish slavery. 
Jai Mazdoor, Jai Hind, Jai Kisan19 
  Free India Government 
 
Appeal of the Central Strike Committee of the R.I.N. 
The Committee has withdrawn the strike. 
Compliments to the brave population. 
Time requires we will fight again. 
On the refusal by Government of the demands by the R.I.N., the R.I.N. ratings went on 
strike. The strike was stamped as ‘mutiny’, and threatened to destroy the entire Indian Navy.  
On this the military workers and the general public supported the just mutiny of the Indian 
ratings. The British Military excited at the solidarity of the people fired on unarmed people. 
Over 350 persons (men and women) were killed and thousands injured. The massacre of 
the Indian navy was saved on account of the solidarity and sacrifices of Hindus, Muslims, 
touchables and untouchables.  
The Central Strike Commiteee has issued the following statement and withdrawn the 
strike…after congratulating the general support of the people and expecting a further 
support, should any of them be victimised or punished. 
For this reason everyone should resume work and refrain from strike after congratulating 
the hundreds of martyrs.  
  D.S. Vaidya, Secretary, Bombay Committee, C.P.I.20 
                                                             
19 In Hindi mazdoor and kisan mean, respectively, worker, labourer and farmer, peasant. 
20 Unless otherwise stated, the documents quoted in this essay, including police files and, below, ratings’ letters, 
were Bombay Police records and are part of papers recently recovered by Shekhar Krishnan in his late father’s 
private archive, Mumbai. They I would like to thank Shekhar for making this material available. 
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The ratings’ own slogans use a less orthodox language, but are also in a collective voice: 
 
An Eye Here Also Please 
Visit the most glorious hell in Bombay – Versova – our demob centre 
Witness here our sufferings – hunger – injustice – oppression 
Witness also the broom and bucket parade – at 6:30 am every morning 
Why do we suffer? Is this the reward of our loyalty and service during the war?21 
 
The C.P.I. was the only party to support the ratings. By the time it intervened, however, the ratings’ 
strike had already spread to most of the navy’s establishments. This is to say that there is little to be 
gained by reducing the R.I.N. uprising to this or any other political organisations. In reality, navy files 
passed on to the Bombay police at the time show that by far the majority of the ratings did not have a 
history of political activism nor had ever belonged to a party. For instance, the file (dated 23 February 
1946) of M.S. Khan, the rating elected unanimously by the ratings as president of the N.C.S.C., states: 
 
he is not connected with any political movement…During the mutiny he almost certainly 
came under the influence of subversive political elements. He has an unusual amount of 
control and command over large number of men and undoubtedly averted several outbreaks 
of violence during the mutiny. 
 
A secret navy communiqué similarly reveals that top navy ranking officials had come to the conclusion 
that ‘the majority have been mislead…our object is to punish the ringleaders…the remainder we wish 
to make into good and willing sailors as soon as possible.’22 In the event, ‘once it was all over, 476 
sailors were permanently discharged from the navy.’23 
                                                             
21 Included as evidence in the Report of the R.I.N. Commission of Enquiry, 1946, British Library: IOR: 
L/MIL/17/9/379, p. 401. For an interesting discussion of conceptualisations of the relation between the crowd 
and the individual in the context of revolutionary socialism in South Asia, more specifically, in Bhagat Singh’s 
writings, see J. Daniel Elam, ‘The “Arch Priestess of Anarchy” Visits Lahore: Violence, Love, and the 
Worldliness of Revolutionary Texts’, in Postcolonial Studies, Vol. 16, no. 2 (2013), pp. 140-54. 
22 John Henry Godfrey, Private Papers. 
23 Doctor, ‘In the 70th Year of Independence, Here is a Look Back at the Long Forgotten 1946 RIN Mutiny’. 
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 After the ‘mutiny’, whether the ratings had since embraced politics or not, found guilty or 
innocent, the Bombay police was tasked to keep track of their movements. Police files list 
systematically hundreds of ratings’ particulars, including R.I.N. number, name, rank, next of kin and 
home address, date of birth, physical description, distinguishing marks, charges, prison in which their 
penalty was to be served and expected date of release. In many instances, a history of the rating’s 
career is also given: 
 
Ex-warrant Engineer M.L. Chandramani, R.I.N.V.R. 
Released from the R.I.N. on 18/4/46 
And at present living at [follows address] Bombay 
Educated at: The Bombay Government High School from 1927 to 1935, and at the B.G. 
National College from 1935 to 1936. Passed matriculation and F.Y.A. 
Was employed by the Bombay telephone Company from 1937 to 1939 as an apprentice on 
a salary of Rs.100/- p.m., then by Caltex & Co. from April 1939 to 1942 in the Accounts 
department on a salary of Rs.100/- p.m.. Following this he was employed as Manager of 
the firm Indo-African Export Coy on a salary of Rs.225/- p.m. from August 1942 to July 
1943. He then left to join the Crescent Transport Company as a supervisor on a salary of 
Rs.150/- p.m.  
Chandramani applied for a Permanent Commission in the Royal Indian Navy in October 
1943, but at that time was not considered. He applied later, in February 1944 stating that he 
had made no previous application and was accepted for a temporary Commission in the 
Special Branch of the Royal Indian Navy Voluntary Reserve.  
Hi Service reports indicate that he was few Officer-like qualities and he has not been 
recommended for a Permanent Commission… 
  A.R. Rattray, Rear Admiral 
 
The likes of M.L. Chandramani were not the rule among the ratings. A glance at the police files – at 
the addresses of their next of kin (usually the father) – shows that by far the majority came from the 
countryside. As B.C. Dutt recounts, before joining the navy many, like Dutt, ‘had never seen an 
Englishman before.’ During WWII the R.I.N. had expanded in an unprecedented way. Regulations 
were changed to recruit largely among the Indian population, male and female.24 Many who joined in 
the first half of the 1940s were recruited from villages where their family’s traditional occupation and 
                                                             
24 The Women Royal Indian Naval Service was set up during WW2 at the initiative of Vice-Admiral John 
Godfrey. See John Henry Godfrey, The Naval Memoirs of Admiral J. H. Godfrey, Vol. 6 1943-1946, 1964, 
deposited on 24 April 1966 at Churchill Archive, GDFY 1/8, p. 81.  
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subsistence was mostly agricultural and clearly caste-defined. Most Indian recruits, on entrance, must 
have thought of themselves, first and foremost, as Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians, belonging 
to specific castes and from very diverse regions of South Asia.25 From here to begin to see oneself as 
a citizen of a nation in the modern sense of the term, as an individual entitled to political participation, 
is an enormous step, and not only in view of the brevity of the uprising. 
In The Glass Palace Amitav Ghosh renders well how long a way many of the men who joined 
the I.N.A. must have travelled: 
 
“But your father and grandfather were here,” Arjun said to Hardy. “It was they who helped 
in the colonisation of these places. They must have seen some of the things that we’ve seen. 
Did they never speak of all this?” 
“They did not see things as we do,” Hardy said. “They were illiterate yaar. You have to 
remember that we’re the first generation of educated Indian soldiers.” 
“But still, they had eyes, they had ears, they must have occasionally talked to local people?” 
Hardy shrugged. “The truth is yaar, they weren’t interested; they didn’t care; the only place 
that was real to them was their village.” 
“How is that even possible…?” 
In the following weeks Arjun thought often of this: it was as though he and his peers had 
been singled out to pay the price of a monumental inwardness.26 
 
As for Ghosh’s protagonists, joining the navy brought the sons of farmers from remote villages of 
India into contact with other parts of the British empire. Whether interaction with the Malay, Burmese 
and other populations gave the newly recruited ratings a sense of being ‘Indian’, or what this might 
have meant to them, is impossible to say here. Andrew Davies has examined the practices and 
organisational structures of the R.I.N. and argued that the spatial politics of life in the navy created 
distinctly maritime social and cultural relations: an understanding of space and place that forced those 
                                                             
25 John Henry Godfrey, Report on the Royal Indian Navy 1943 – 1944, 1945, Imperial War Museum London, 
Documents.3250, Appendix 1, Tables 6 and 7 show that on 31 December 1944 the R.I.N.’s communal 
distribution and ‘development’ was as follows: 7,375 Hindus, 9,215 Muslims, 3,855 Christians, 225 Anglo-
Indians, 79 Parsees, 232 Sikhs and 155 ‘Others’. By far the largest intake increase from the previous year had 
been among Hindus (up by 68 per cent). The same report also shows that 7,312 were from the Southern 
Provinces, 3,221 from the Western Provinces, 4,021 from the Eastern Provinces, 453 from the Central 
Provinces, 6,002 from the North and North-West Frontier Provinces, and 127 ‘Miscellaneous’. By far the largest 
intake increase since 1943 was from the Southern Provinces (up by 62 per cent). 
26 Amitav Ghosh, The Glass Palace (London: Harper Collins, 2001), pp. 348-49. 
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who joined to leave behind, or at least put on hold, traditional, religiously legitimated social 
conventions.27 Moments of this process are manifest in the statements given by the ratings to the R.I.N. 
Commission of Enquiry. Without exception the ratings appear to have experienced this process as an 
abuse, a deprivation. For instance, Seaman Abdul Latif is reported to complain that ‘he was given pig’s 
flesh to eat, although he was a Muslim’,28 while communication rating T.K. Murti 
 
and 7 other ratings were sent to Officers’ Mess to clean utensils, forks and spoons, 
etc.…they were sent to do this work because there was no other work for [them]. He is a 
Brahmin.…The same spoons that were used for non-vegetarians were used for 
vegetarians.29 
 
While deprived of what they clearly perceived as traditional entitlements, each of the ratings expressed 
in these statements also a great deal of pride about their newly acquired identity: their position and 
role as units of an institution that had promised them something better than what they had where they 
had come from. For many did join the navy to escape poor living conditions, looking for a better way 
to sustain their family, complement its farming income, and for better prospects. All of the ratings who 
appeared as witnesses in front of the Commission of Enquiry were thus acutely aware that to specific 
ranks and roles attached specific wages, for so it was stated in the navy’s recruitment pamphlets and 
regulations: 
 
Mohd. Nasrullah – Store assistant in H.M.I.S. Akbar. He has passed the Intermediate 
Examination and was recruited in 1945…He was recruited on Rs.65/- and is now getting 
Rs.70/-. He says that this is too meagre a sum as a chaprassi can easily earn Rs.40/- or 
Rs.50/- a month.30 
 
                                                             
27 Andrew Davies, ‘From “Landsman” to “Seaman”? Colonial Discipline, Organization and Resistance in the 
Royal Indian Navy, 1946’, in Social and Cultural Geography, Vol. 14, no. 8 (2013), pp. 868-87. 
28 Report of the R.I.N. Commission of Enquiry, p. 537. 
29 Ibid. These complaints are clearly reminiscent of 1857. For a thought-provoking discussion of the functioning 
and resonances of religious identity and ideas of pollution from the perspective of Indian nationalism and 
modernity, see Faisal Devji, ‘The Mutiny to Come’, in New Literary History, Vol. 40, no. 2 (2009), pp. 411-30. 
30 Ibid., p. 533. 
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M.G.K. Moorthi – He joined the navy in October 1942…He had passed his Matriculation 
Examination. He is now getting Rs.150/- in Bombay. He says that at the time of recruitment 
the Recruiting Officer told him that a Warrant Officer’s pay was Rs.250/- to Rs.300/-. When 
asked whether a matriculate hoped to get Rs.250/- in 6 months after beginning on Rs.40/-, 
he said he believed the Recruiting Officer because he showed him examples of matriculates 
who became commissioned officer and cited his own instance.31 
 
B. Kothu – he comes from Ratnagiri and was recruited to the R.I.N. in Bombay in 1942. 
He said “Commander Smith said that I will be given Rs.50/- as pay on the H.M.I.S. Bahadur 
and was given only Rs.14/14-.”32 
 
The rating advanced pay and career demands that would have been unconceivable in the pre-industrial 
economy from which they originally came. But this is not to say that although the navy did challenge 
and perhaps undermined the ratings’ sense of themselves as belonging to religiously sanctioned social 
categories, in depriving them of the privileges that traditional Indian society accorded them, the navy 
also transformed these men into fully modern individuals. Like any other military institution, the navy 
at best replaced, at worst simply overwrote, those pre-modern categories other, equally non-negotiable 
positions within a rigid military hierarchy. Hence the ratings’ complaints that, in reality, not only pay, 
but also other rank entitlements and status were not respected:  
 
Though a communication rating, I had to do much work for which I was not recruited…I 
was asked to scrub the deck and paint the ship’s side and do other things…while my duty 
was radar operator…Because of improper treatment by the officers many ratings refused to 
do work for which they were not recruited. They were placed behind bars for the refusal. 
They were kept in the cells for 16 days. They were radar ratings.33 
 
The personnel of the Accountant Branch were…not employed for the brick-laying 
business…Lieutenant Menzies asked us to do this work as well as cleaning lorries which 
can easily be done by civilian coolies at the current rate…We 23 Writers who were qualified 
were treated worse than a P.W..34  
 
                                                             
31 Ibid., p. 535. 
32 Ibid., p. 536. 
33 Ibid., p. 537. 
34 Ibid., p. 536. 
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We have been told that our navy is based on the model of the Royal Navy. The same 
principles are followed, but the pay is different…We always compare ourselves to our 
mother Navy, the Royal Navy and expect the same conditions, because in the [recruitment] 
pamphlets our status was compared to that in the R.N..35  
 
Written all over the ratings’ complaints is a sense of being bereft of status. They struck work in order 
to demand that the R.I.N. upheld its regulation, not to challenge it as an institution. They were thus 
taken by surprise when R.I.N. command and the colonial administration labelled their action a 
‘mutiny’, because none of them saw themselves, to begin with, as making political demands. 
Written several decades after the events, B.C. Dutt’s Mutiny of the Innocents retrospectively 
presents its protagonist, the young B.C. Dutt himself, as politically inspired from the start. He was, 
after all, arrested for painting a nationalist slogan on the walls of the H.M.I.S. Talwar, and it was also 
in his support that signal trainees on the same establishment struck work. Yet one of the most salient 
moments in B.C. Dutt’s dramatic story is when he realises the full implications of that spontaneous, 
impulsive and solitary act. This is how he describes the mental leap that took over him after being 
arrested and interrogated for hours to the point of exhaustion: 
 
I was a senior rating-Leading Telegraphist…I was taken into custody. Only then did the 
enormity of the crime dawn on me. It was a jolt out of a beautiful dream…I was almost 
senseless with fear. My whole future, my one ambition of making the Navy my career, 
appeared to be in ruin. It was a strange sensation. I thought I would not be able to walk the 
distance of about a hundred yards to the Guard Room. After a few minutes, I noticed 
Syam…and some other trainee ratings being brought under escort toward the Guard Room. 
They were innocent. None of them had anything to do with our movement. But all of them 
were close to me…Once I saw them under arrest, I came back to my senses. Fear left me 
completely. Now I could see my position clearly. I realised I was a prize prisoner. 
[After hours of interrogation] I made my stand clearer. I told them that I considered 
myself a political prisoner and not a lowly criminal. And so I was entitled to certain basic 
amenities…The Admiral said: you are not a political prisoner, there is no such thing in the 
Navy. You are a defaulter and are being treated as such. Naval regulation cannot be changed 
to suit your fancy.” 
 “I have nothing more to add, Sir,” I replied and went into total silence. That suited 
me fine.36 
                                                             
35 Ibid., p. 534. 
36 Dutt, Mutiny of the Innocents, pp. 105, 114. 
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It is only when he finally realises that by virtue of his ‘crime’ he is no longer entitled to his military 
privileges that B.C. Dutt comes to fully identify with the national slogan he had hastily painted on the 
ship’s walls. No sooner his military status is taken away from him that something else comes to his 
rescue: the realisation that as a political prisoner he would be 
 
entitled to certain basic amenities. If I am denied the amenities there is no question of my 
taking part in any further proceedings. More: not only I would not answer questions but I 
would not eat. It was a play for more time. A respite was badly needed.37  
 
Similarly, Abdul Hamid Malabari, a rating from H.M.I.S. Nasik, wrote in a letter (dated 25 April 1946) 
to the press from Mullund Camp, where he was imprisoned with hundreds of other ratings: 
 
Sirs,…the fact is that when I was on board a ship an officer abused me. I said “Sir, do not 
abuse me.” At this he was offended and put me in open arrest. After this, these people read 
out a punishment to me. The punishment was this – 3 months Arthur Road jail. On the 
second day the strike occurred. In this I took an active part. Due to this they were unable to 
punish me. Now I am in Mullund Camp (East Camp) and am undergoing great hardship. 
 
I return to this and similar letters shortly. My point here is that being bereft of status, deprived of the 
privileges that came with caste, religious affiliation or military rank was a fundamental dimension of 
the ratings’ journey towards, perhaps, politicisation, more likely, given the evidence, something more 
important: a new sense of self without which progressive politicisation would have not been possible. 
This is not to say that the ratings were not affected by the political movements of this conjuncture. I 
am arguing, rather, that in order to be receptive to the idealism of their time, the ratings must have 
undergone a process of individuation, whereby they began to think of themselves as individuals, free 
from traditional, military or other hierarchical classifications and entitled to participation, as equal and 
                                                             
37 Ibid., p. 113. 
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private individuals, into a democratic public sphere willing to enfranchise their subjective needs. It is 
this process that their letters manifest. 
In Mutiny of the Innocents B.C. Dutt claims that when the ratings were called to testify in front 
of the commission they were advised not to reveal their ‘conspiratorial activities’ and ‘blame none. 
Discrimination, bad food, bad service conditions, discontent, yes; but no politics.’38 Yet, even if purged 
of any politics, perhaps in the interest of the testifying strikers, it is nevertheless a challenge to the 
R.I.N.’s authority that gradually emerges from the ratings’ evidence. It emerges, I argue, in spite of 
the ratings themselves – out of an acquired but spontaneous sense of status deprivation, an acutely 
perceived inconsistency39 between what they deemed their entitlements to be and the reality of these 
entitlements’ negation: 
 
We were told “When you will be released, you will be provided service somewhere”. This 
turned out to be an absolutely false promise…I believed in that promise. There was no 
reason not to accept an Officer’s word on that occasion.40 
 
C.R. Kumar…referred to continued disappointment from the time of recruitment onwards 
in all phases of life in the RIN and to the hatred of the system of the administration produced 
thereby.41  
 
From where they stood, if the R.I.N. was not capable or willing to grant them the rights to which they 
were entitled by their rank, then what right did the navy have to demand compliance? It is as if 
politicisation sets in at this point by default and, as in B.C. Dutt’s dramatic account, in the first instance 
as a strategy for survival under duress, a practical move of defence against the punishment imposed 
by an institution which they fully embraced but which punished them for upholding its very standards. 
And as the institution legitimating their new military sense of entitlement, the navy, and its authority 
                                                             
38 Ibid., p. 220. 
39 For the notion of status deprivation and inconsistency in an earlier context, see Michael McKeon’s The 
Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987). 
40 Report of the R.I.N. Commission of Enquiry, p. 533. 
41 Ibid., p. 538. 
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gradually came to be called into question, then so did the colonial apparatus of which the navy was an 
essential element. The shooting of civilians on the fourth day must have done the rest. It was a violent, 
indiscriminate attack that effectively bridged the gulf between the sailors – cut off and isolated in Fort 
and Castle Barracks – and the crowds marching outside. This was a crowd whose energy and discontent 
was being scooped up by the sections of political opposition that had a history of mobilisation with the 
city’s working population. But the activities of the C.P.I. or any radical agent did not make the ratings 
political; what turned them, perhaps in large numbers, collectively into opponents of the Raj, in spite 
of the nationalist leaderships’ refusal of support, was the denial of perceived (and promised) 
entitlements and the army charge. 
Collective political mobilisation, however, does neither require nor necessarily result in a sense 
of enfranchisement into the public sphere as a private individual. As Indian historians have long 
argued, there was little in Gandhi’s strategies or address that made room for that. Noting, in another 
context, that for Gandhi ‘Kisans and Labour’ were not to be organised ‘on an all-India basis’,42 Ranajit 
Guha has also observed that 
 
[S]o we get within the ideological unity of Gandhism as a whole the conception of a national 
framework of politics in which the peasants are mobilised but do not participate, of a nation 
of which they are a part but a national state from which they are forever distanced.43 
 
Something other than collective political mobilisation intervened to lend the striking ratings a sense of 
individuation in the modern sense of the term. On the six day, the S.C.N.C. decided to surrender 
unconditionally. The ratings were sent to prison camps in the thousands and, after months there, either 
discharged with dishonour or sent to prisons across the country. From there, they sent short letters that 
were intercepted by the military and eventually passed on to the Bombay police, whose task it was to 
                                                             
42Mohandas K. Gandhi, Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place, Ahmedabad, 1941, 
[https://www.gandhiheritageportal.org/mahatma-gandhi-books/constructive-programme-its-meaning-and-
place#page/6/mode/2up, accessed 18 April 2017]. 
43 Ranajt Guha, ‘Gandhi and the Critique of Civil Society’, in Ranajit Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies III: Writing 
on South Asian History and Society (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 194. 
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keep track of the incriminated ratings when eventually released. These letters speak, first and foremost, 
of physical deprivation: 
 
[T]hose other boys who are in the other camp got diorrhoea [sic], the reason for this is they 
were given bad food. There are here 100 or 200 men in bad health…These people are 
discharging men in small groups at a time. They are not giving them anything or any 
money,…At present I am not feeling well also. 
Your friend M.A. Hamid R.I.N. i.e. I.N.N.44 
 
Some of our men in South Camp have been taken away. I do not know what their condition 
is. It appears they will be sent to jail. But the policy is to discharge them. Their P.I.B.s have 
been collected, their kit has been mustered and collected. Their lost kit has also been 
collected…What more should I write? 
  Yours faithfully, Rajeshwas Singh, writing from East Camp 
 
Second, they speak of isolation: 
 
Sir please write all affairs in detail because we do not receive any news from outside. 
 
(Translation of a latter from Kanarese dated 30.4.46 from E.S.R. Shenoy, Prison No. 27836, 
Yeravda Central Prison, Poona, (ex-R.I.N. rating) to M.N. Shenoy, Room No. 16, Floor 
No. 2 [follows full address], Dadar, Bombay.) 
Shantaram’s namaskars to Annaya. In their power they have awarded me 42 days. They 
have kept the punishment a secret. No witness has come against me. When I was awarded 
punishment there was nobody with me. I was taken to Mulund and there awarded 
punishment and brought here secretly. There are still 28 days left for me.  
 
A very serious charge is being laid against me. I have no one to help me. Sir, have mercy 
on me and give this to the press. My name is Abdul Hamid Malabari. 
 
Third, there is a clear sense in these letters that none of the ratings by this time regarded themselves 
any longer as a member of the navy. From imprisonment they write to friends signing as friends, or to 
the press giving simply their name: 
 
                                                             
44 Indian National Navy. 
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Dear friend, I am quite well…I wrote letter when I was detained in Mulund Camp you may 
received. Now I am in Yarwad central Jail for the period 28 days which I was sentenced by 
the R.I.N. authorities. I am coming Bombay on the 15th of May. Up to that time please 
collect my private articles. Please pass my Namaste to all your friends. 
   G.P. Gupta ex-R.I.N. 
 
The ratings’ rank within the navy had given them a new sense of entitlement, but this was now taken 
away from them. It is at this point of ultimate dejection and isolation – stripped of all they thought they 
had as Brahmin, Hindu or Muslim, Communication Officers or Chief Petty Officers – that the ratings 
begin to speak of themselves no longer or not only as farmers’ sons or ratings, but first and foremost 
as private individuals. 
 
The logic of historical realism 
 
We can now begin to grasp the importance of the fact that, contrary to historical interpretations, R.I.N. 
strikers’ requests and actions were neither simply about poor conditions of service, nor were they 
mouthpieces for the C.P.I.. Their ‘Charter of Demands’ asked for things that, on the surface, may seem 
disparate, even contradictory, as, for instance, on the one hand that ‘British nationals quit India’ and, 
on the other, ‘equal status with the British navy regarding pay, family allowances and other facilities’. 
Running through the ratings’ charter are two discourses: of (colonial) rank privilege and, at the same 
time, nationalist politics. But the contradiction is only apparent. From where they stood, not one of 
their individual demands must have seemed more important than, separate from, or in tension with the 
others. Just as in the ratings’ statements to the R.I.N. Commission of Enquiry complaints of unfair 
treatment, poor working conditions and lack of prospects were expressed also as a general and 
widespread discontent about the R.I.N., so here the right to both better treatment and working 
conditions and to political self-determination are expressed in the same sheet, as a single charter. To 
separate out one type of demand from the other – or to coerce the events of February 1946 into either 
one narrative (of mere conditions of service) or the other (of pre-organised politicisation) – is to pass 
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in silence the radical social transformation undergone by these men: from Hindu or Muslim farmer, to 
proud colonial sailor, to nationalist striker and finally, all this having been taken away from them, to 
nothing more than a private individual. It was only from such a position of individuation that the ratings 
could become politicised in a progressive sense of the term (as opposed to collectively mobilised), for 
as Hannah Arendt observed 
 
Being seen and being heard by others derive their significance from the fact that everybody 
sees and hears from a different position. This is the meaning of public life… Only where things 
can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without changing their identity [their private 
subjectivity], so that those who are gathered around them know they see sameness in utter 
diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably appear.45 
 
For historian Bipan Chandra too many limitations marked the ratings’ uprising for it to be 
regarded as a movement that could have led India to a more radical path. There was, in Chandra’s 
view, 
 
no place for the men and women of small towns and villages who had formed the backbone 
of the mass movements of the earlier decades…the upheavals were confined to a few urban 
centres…The communal unity witnessed was more organisational unity than unity of the 
people…The view that communal unity forged in the struggles of 1945-46 could, if taken 
further, have averted partition, seems to be based on wishful thinking rather than concrete 
historical possibility…The Congress’ role is seen as one of defusing the revolutionary 
situation, prompted by its fear that the situation would go out of its control…The belief is 
that if the Congress leaders had not surrendered for their desire for power, a different path 
to independence would have emerged. In our view, [the R.I.N. mutiny and the upsurges 
triggered by the I.N.A. trials] were an extension of the earlier nationalist activities with 
which the Congress was integrally associated.46 
 
In actual fact the R.I.N. uprising extended well beyond the urban centres of Bombay and Karachi: the 
Report of the R.I.N. Commission of Enquiry shows that but a very small number of R.I.N. 
establishments failed to join the uprising, and the many that did were located across the Indian Ocean. 
The extent of the strike and the speed at which it spread were significantly helped by the ratings’ 
                                                             
45 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 57. 
46 Chandra, India’s Struggle for Independence, pp. 481-84. 
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control of telecommunications, which should not be underestimated.47 R.I.N. annual reports and police 
files also indicate that by far the majority of the ratings were originally from small towns and villages. 
As for communal unity, the evidence – including pamphlets, personal accounts and photographs – is 
that it was spontaneous, in spite of organisational disunity (for instance, Congress and the Muslim 
League’s initially divergent positions, or Jinnah’s later appeal to some ratings as ‘Muslim ratings’). 
That leaves us with the Congress and with Chandra’s claim that the belief that the communal unity 
which marked this and other uprisings of 1945-46 could, ‘if taken further, have averted partition, seems 
to be based on wishful thinking rather than concrete historical possibility.’48 
What evidence there is shows that the Congress leadership was both taken by surprise and 
either incapable or unwilling to grasp the significance of the ratings’ actions. On 19 February the 
ratings appealed to Aruna Asaf Ali to intervene on their behalf, to address a meeting and to act as their 
spokesperson. She advised them to remain calm, and to go see Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the highest 
Congress authority in the city at the time. Patel in turn advised them to lay down all arms and go 
through the formality of a surrender, promising them that the Congress would do its level best to see 
that there would be no victimisation. ‘We are not surrendering to the British. We are surrendering to 
our own people’, he told them.49 On 23 February, in a statement to the press, Gandhi declared:  
 
I have followed the events now happening in India with painful interest…This mutiny and 
what is following is not, in any sense of the term, non-violent action… There is such a thing 
as thoughtful violent action. What I see happening now is not thoughtful.50 
 
                                                             
47 It is a measure of the ratings’ control of telecommunications that, as documents in the British Library show, 
telegraphic communication between Prime Minister Attlee and the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, was interrupted for 
whole days at a time, especially during the first few days of the uprising. 
48 Chandra, India’s Struggle for Independence, p. 482. 
49 Quoted in Rajmohan Gandhi, Patel: A Life (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 2005), p. 355. 
50 Mohandas K. Gandhi, ‘572. Statement to the Press’, in Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 89 (New 
Delhi: Publications Division Government of India, 1999), p. 441. 
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The following day, in a private letter to Gandhi (dated 24 February 1946) Patel complained: ‘We are 
done for, finished, if we don’t stand up to this.’51 He explained to the Mahatma: 
 
She [Aruna Asaf Ali] wired Jawahar [Nehru]…Jawahar sent me a wire saying that if 
necessary he would leave important work and come. I replied that he need not. Even so he 
comes tomorrow.52 
 
On his arrival, on 25 February 1946, Nehru commended the ratings for their bravery, but reminded 
them of the violence at the disposal of the state: 
 
Unless it is the violence of the armies…, petty insurrectionary type of action…must go 
down before superior violence…If there is going to be violence, it should be on the biggest 
scale possible at the right time with the right preparation.53 
 
Congress leaders condemned the spontaneity that characterised the ratings’ action, which they 
dismissed as ‘petty’, disqualified as ‘not thoughtful’, and ultimately perceived as a threat to the 
Congress and its leadership. As John M. Meyer also noted,54 Congress leaders, determined to play a 
decisive role in the transfer of power, feared that a military-led insurrection might cost them their place 
at the negotiating table. With their open refusal of support, as much as with the words in the 
correspondence cited above, Congress thus dissociated itself fully from the uprising. They did not see 
the ratings’ strike as an extension of earlier nationalist activities, and rightly so. With the benefit of 70 
years of hindsight, the ratings’ trajectory, had it been ‘taken further’, appears today to have had 
potentially far greater consequences than collective mobilisation. What the leadership’s ‘thoughtful’, 
‘rightly prepared’ strategies left behind – what was, in Guha’s words, ‘forever distanced’ – was the 
                                                             
51 Gandhi, Patel: A Life, p. 356. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 15, S. Gopal (ed.) (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 
1982), pp. 11-12. 
54 Meyer, ‘The Royal Indian Navy Mutiny of 1946: Nationalist Competition and Civil-Military Relations in 
Postwar India’. 
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ratings’ own sense of active participation, their enfranchisement as individuals into an emerging Indian 
democratic public sphere. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Congress failed to assess the long-term consequences of their dismissal of the ratings. These are 
in full sight today, at a time when Hindutva - an ideology promoting the hegemony of Hindus, of the 
Hindu way of life and, in Narendra Modi’s inflection, a call to become Hindu politically - is conflated 
all too successfully with the nation and its future.55 Can, in this present context, an uprising marked by 
individuals uniting as individuals, above and beyond religious and caste identification, really be 
written off as ‘wishful thinking’? The way out of this may well require us to think ‘unrealistically’. 
Imagining – as Alexander Kluge urges us to do in this article’s opening quotation and as we tried to 
do with Vivan Sundaram’s new installation – that ‘the same story can take a different direction’56 can 
also enable us to brush history against the grain, against entrenched patterns of ‘realistic’ thought. The 
R.I.N. uprising of 1946 was a short-lived event – six days that are now mostly forgotten, leaving behind 
a bundle of letters from a few disgraced men. But what Kluge calls an ‘economy of combined trivials’57 
can challenge dominant economies of ‘reality’. Such a position, even though purely hypothetical, has, 
as Devin Fore reminds us,58 ‘inestimable tactical value.’ Perhaps our public, whose response to the 
installation was enthusiastic, also felt this way when they asked: who were these men? This article was 
written in answer to that question.   
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